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The global record of jihadist terrorism

In 2025 the world recorded 5,582 deaths from terrorism across 2,944 attacks. Four organisations caused 3,869 of them, seventy per cent of the global total: Islamic State, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and al-Shabaab. All four are jihadist. None of them fights Israel. Almost everyone they kill is Muslim.

This section exists because of an argument that gets made constantly and is never checked: that jihadist violence is a response to Israel, to the occupation, or to Western support for either. The claim is testable. The data is published annually by an institute in Sydney, compiled from open sources, and it says something the argument cannot survive.

The Institute for Economics and Peace publishes the Global Terrorism Index, scoring 163 countries. The 2026 edition, covering 2025, ranks them like this.

RankCountryGTI scoreNote
1Pakistan8.5741,139 deaths, first time at the top
2Burkina Faso8.324JNIM and Islamic State Sahel
3Niger7.816JNIM and ISWAP
4Nigeria7.792Boko Haram and ISWAP
5Mali7.586JNIM
6Syria7.545Islamic State remnants
7Somalia7.391al-Shabaab
8DR Congo7.171ADF, an Islamic State affiliate
9Colombia7.116ELN and FARC dissidents
10Israel6.790
11Afghanistan6.678Islamic State Khorasan
12Cameroon6.593Boko Haram
13India6.428
14Myanmar6.245
15Mozambique6.022Islamic State Mozambique

Israel is tenth. Every country above it except Colombia is a place where jihadist organisations kill people, and in every one of those places the dead are overwhelmingly Muslim. Five countries alone, Pakistan, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger and the DRC, account for close to seventy per cent of the world’s terrorism deaths.

The Sahel accounts for more than half of all global terrorism deaths on its own. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are landlocked states two and a half thousand miles from Jerusalem, with no Israeli policy to respond to, no settlements, no checkpoints, and no Jews.

This is the fact that decides the argument, and it is not a talking point invented for it. It is what the casualty tables say every year.

Boko Haram’s dead are Nigerian Muslim villagers, and its most famous victims are the schoolgirls it took from Chibok. Al-Shabaab’s dead are Somalis, including roughly 590 killed by one truck bomb at a Mogadishu junction in October 2017, the deadliest terrorist attack in African history, attributed to al-Shabaab though the group never claimed it. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s dead are Pakistani police, soldiers and schoolchildren, 132 of them at the Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014. Islamic State’s largest single massacre of civilians was of Yazidis at Sinjar in 2014, and its second constituency of victims was Shia Muslims, whom its doctrine classifies as apostates deserving death.

A movement that kills Muslims by the thousand in countries with no Israeli presence is not a movement about Israel. It is a movement with a theology of who may be killed, and Jews are one entry on a list that includes Shia, Sufis, Ahmadis, Yazidis, Christians, Hindus, apostates, and any Sunni Muslim who declines to submit to it.

The word that gets used to stop the conversation

Section titled “The word that gets used to stop the conversation”

Anyone who reads a table of dead Nigerian villagers and Pakistani schoolchildren as an attack on Muslims has the numbers upside down, and usually knows it. The people in that table are Muslims, killed by other Muslims for being insufficiently Muslim, and the distinction between Islam, Muslim and Islamist is not a courtesy extended to anyone. It is load-bearing: two billion people on one side, a twentieth-century political movement on the other, and the first group supplying almost all of the second group’s victims.

The charge of bigotry is deployed here because the numbers cannot be argued with. It works exactly once per reader, and only before they have seen the table.

Israel is tenth. Nine countries above it, eight of them killing fields for jihadist organisations, more than half the world’s terrorism deaths in the Sahel, and seventy per cent of them from four groups that have never fired a shot at an Israeli.

Every explanation that begins with the occupation has to account for Burkina Faso, and none of them do. The violence aimed at Israel is one regional franchise of something global, which is why every proposal to end it locally has failed for a hundred years, and why the people insisting that this time the local fix will work have never once been asked to explain Mali.